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If God grants me life…the last thing that I would like to study would be the problem of 
war…There again I would have to cross into the problem of law. (Foucault, 1990: 167) 
 
In developing descriptions and explanations of the international legal landscape, our 
disciplinary cartography tends to construct borders around the spaces recognized as law, 
privileging particular spaces and excluding, or rendering invisible, other spaces and the 
interactions within these spaces from the ambit of 'international law'. (Pearson, 2008: 
490) 
 
I.War, law and geography 
In a recent Progress Report David Delaney (2014: 4) makes a simple, though frequently 
overlooked point: “there is nothing in the world of spaces, places, landscapes, and 
environments that is not affected by the workings of law”. What Nicholas Blomley (1989) 
once termed the ‘law-space nexus’ extends from city sidewalks (Blomley, 2011) to the global 
economy (Barkan, 2011), and as far out as the geostationary orbit (Collis, 2009). We live in 
what Delaney (2010) calls a ‘nomosphere’. 
 
Yet, with some notable exceptions (Delaney, 2009; Smith, 2014), critical legal geography 
(CLG) has not considered spaces of war as spaces that are defined by – and made through – 
law. Perhaps there is good reason for this. War is, after all, traditionally understood as the 
antithesis of law. In spaces and times of war, the ‘rule of law’ gives way to a lawless Kantian 
‘state of nature’. Mainstream legal theory distinguishes law from violence, a view that is 
frequently bolstered with reference to Cicero’s ‘maxim’, inter arma enim silent leges: in times of 
war, the law falls silent. The logic is a binary one; war represents chaos and violence, and law 
represents order and peace, Cicero’s point being that the necessities of war drown out the 
voice of law. 
 
But far from ‘falling silent’, law constantly intervenes in and gives shape to war. For example, 
International law articulates the ‘right’ to go to war and defines the contours of what shall 
count as legal and legitimate ‘self-defence’. It also draws lines between ‘legal’ (‘just’) and ‘illegal’ 
(‘unjust’) wars. In fact, the resort to the use of force – jus ad bellum – is highly regulated in 
international law under the United Nations Charter. Another set of quite different laws apply 
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after battle commences. The laws of war, otherwise known as International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) or jus in bello, seek to “limit the suffering caused by war by protecting and assisting its 
victims as far as possible” (ICRC, 2004). It does so by proscribing certain actions and the use 
of particular weapons, but for every ban exists a permission to do or to use something else. 
Land mines, for example, are banned but nuclear weapons are not. The laws of war are full of 
these kinds of paradoxes. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 classify the deliberate killing of 
civilians as a ‘war crime’. But killing combatants is well within the bounds of the law, as is 
accidentally – or incidentally – killing civilians (so long as their deaths are ‘proportional’ to the 
foreseen ‘military advantage’ gained by carrying out an attack). War, it turns out, is saturated 
with law.  
 
The idea of war as a juridical operation has received renewed interest in the last decade and a 
half, and has been spurred in no small part by the emergence of the ‘global war on terror’ 
waged in the wake of 9/11. Central to these accounts has been the assertion that war, violence 
and law are not separate or oppositional spheres, but rather animate one another in all kinds 
of ways. New concepts have emerged to grapple with putatively new problems posed by this 
commingling of the legal and the lethal. In 2001, a prominent US military lawyer proposed the 
neologism 'lawfare', which he defined as “the use of law as a weapon of war” and he argued 
that it has become the “most recent feature of twenty-first century combat” (Dunlap, 2001a: 
5). Scholars from diverse backgrounds seem to agree. “Warfare”, writes critical legal scholar 
David Kennedy (2006: 6) “has become a modern legal institution.” Similarly, architect and 
theorist Eyal Weizman (2011) has written of a 'humanitarian present' animated in large part by 
the warp and weft of war and law. Meanwhile, Derek Gregory (2006; 2011) has insisted that 
we read the wars conducted in the shadow of 9/11 not only as a war on law but also as a war 
conducted through law. 
 
In this paper I use the concept of lawfare to explore the relationship between war and law, but 
I also want to think about the ways in which this relationship has been forged through time 
and space. Charles Dunlap, who popularized the term lawfare, argued that it is a 21st Century 
phenomenon that emerged during what he called the ‘hyperlegalism’ of the US-led NATO 
bombing of Kosovo and Serbia in 1999. Kosovo and Serbia were distinguished by lawfare 
because, in his view, the Serbs, the media and the international community strategically used 
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the language of law to delegitimise the military campaign. In Dunlap’s view, and according to 
a growing neo-conservative literature, lawfare is a new and negative phenomenon that poses 
a threat to US – and Israeli – national security (e.g. Goldstein and Meyer, 2009; The Lawfare 
Project, nd).  
 
There are several other ways of thinking about lawfare. The first aim of this review is to show 
that the claim that lawfare is new is based on a particularly a-geographical and a-historical 
reading of the relationship between war and law. The second and related aim is to show how 
CLG, and its cognate fields third world approaches to international law (TWAIL) and critical 
legal studies (CLS), can help to recover the geographies (and histories) of lawfare. This will, in 
turn, help us to construct an explicitly geographical theorization of lawfare and the relationship 
between war and law. Lawfare is important, I argue, because it shows that war and law are 
entangled and while the concept lacks reflexivity about the changeable nature of that 
relationship across space and time, it does identify events and processes that suggest that law 
is becoming increasingly important in the conduct of what Gregory (2010) has called ‘late-
modern war’. If we want to understand how war ‘gets done’, we must also understand the role 
that law plays in shaping its conduct.  
 
In section II I examine why lawfare matters to geography and what geographical perspectives 
can offer to current understandings of lawfare. The following three sections consider three 
different ways of reading lawfare. In the final section I re-situate the recent lawfare debate 
within a broader and richer set of processes that can be productively thought about in terms 
of the juridification of war.  
 
II.Why lawfare needs geography… and why it matters to Geography  
Legalization has expanded in contemporary world politics, but that expansion is uneven. (Goldstein 
et al, 2001: 388) 
 
A sizeable literature on lawfare has emerged over the last decade and a half. Most of its 
interlocutors have been military lawyers and international legal scholars. The debate has mostly 
been confined to law and military journals, but has also recently appeared in news and media 
accounts (Gordon, 2014). While ostensibly distant from the immediate interests of 
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geographers, lawfare provides geography with series of entry points into broader 
conversations concerning what we might call the legal geographies of war. In turn, and as the 
above quote suggests, lawfare and processes of legalization require geographical explanation 
and interpretation.   
 
Lawfare is particularly salient for CLG. The concept of lawfare is an amalgamation of the 
terms ‘law’ and ‘warfare’. By bringing these terms together, proponents of lawfare suggest that 
law and war (and by extension, violence) are coterminous with one another. Lawfare’s 
recognition that law and violence have a synergistic – rather than oppositional – relation is 
interesting because it resembles a key tenet of critical approaches to law. And yet, surprisingly, 
these literatures do not cite one another. The encounter could be both interesting and 
productive. What do these approaches – a militarist conception of law as a weapon and a 
critical legal perspective that identifies law as inherently violent – have in common, and how 
do they differ? For its part, lawfare offers CLG an opportunity to engage with timely and 
important questions about the (changing) relationship between war and law and to consider 
the legal geographies of war, a point I revisit below. Part of the problem with the lawfare 
literature is that it tacitly assumes that all wars, everywhere and equally, have become wars of 
law. Proponents of lawfare have not considered space, or the geographies of lawfare, an 
endeavour that geographers have recently began to undertake (e.g. Jones, forthcoming(a); 
Morrissey, 2011; Smith, 2014).       
 
But conventional accounts of lawfare offer less of a theory of the relation between law and 
violence – and even less a history or geography of that relation – so much as they represent 
contemporary ideological battles for legitimacy in the ‘war on terror’. When Dunlap and 
subsequent commentators say that law is being used as a weapon, they mean first that it is the 
enemy ‘Other’ who has turned law into a weapon but also, second, that the ‘weapon’ in 
question is primarily discursive or metaphorical, and is not physically violent. Proponents of 
lawfare are worried that the opponents of US and Israeli militarism are using law as a political 
tool to achieve their own military ends; lawfare is therefore a discursive charge against those 
who ‘abuse’ the word and rule of law. The classic example is the enemies’ use of civilian 
populations as ‘human shields’. This is a form of ‘guerilla’ tactic adopted by Iraqi insurgents, 
Hezbollah, and Hamas alike, and it inverts the asymmetric power relations between two 
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warring parties first by making the ‘weak’ enemy difficult to locate (they ‘hide’ in densely 
populated urban areas) and second by making the attacking party look immoral, reckless and 
ultimately criminal if and when innocent people are killed. By this logic, lawfare 
disproportionately harms technologically advanced militaries that purportedly go to great pains 
to abide by the laws and norms of international law; meanwhile, it empowers those who 
deliberately break the law.  
 
More recently, however, a ‘positive’ definition of lawfare has emerged. Proponents of lawfare 
(mainly from Israel and the US) have realized that it is not only the ‘enemy’ who can use law 
as a weapon, but that “democratic militaries” can and should do too (Dunlap, 2009: 35). While 
the ‘Others’ lawfare remains illegitimate (Newton, 2011), ‘democratic’ lawfare is variously 
described as an ‘affirmative’ (Dunlap, 2009) ‘counterlawfare strategy’ (Bilsborough, 2011), 
giving it a benign and defensive gloss. But the admission by military thinkers that ‘democratic 
militaries’ should use law as a weapon does something else: it undermines the legitimacy of 
those militaries that claim to be invested in spreading the ‘rule of law’. That claim only works 
if law is seen as an impartial arbiter of conflict, and not if law is viewed as an instrument of 
power. The point to emphasise here is that according to the lawfare literature, those who wield 
law as a weapon are not inflicting the same physical or bodily violence that are the hallmarks 
of war; they are deploying law to gain legitimacy.  
 
But what if lawfare were capable of inscribing more than discursive or metaphorical violence? 
Lawfare’s simplistic account of the relation between violence and law could be greatly enriched 
by CLG and its theorizations of the relationship between law, violence and space. In particular, 
it could show that law(fare) is not merely a discursive construction but a performative ‘speech 
act’ (Austin, 1975) that has ‘worldly effects’ (Delaney, 2010) on the battlefield, and in the flesh. 
Indeed, as Blomley (2003: 121) points out, CLG draws from rich philosophical debates about 
the relation between (state) law and violence that go back to at least John Locke and his 
assertion that “the sine qua non of political power was law’s right to create the penalty of 
death.” More recently, in his famous essay on the Critique of Violence, Benjamin (1978) argued 
that law is founded on violence (through revolution, colonization, coup d’état) and is maintained 
by violence (through police and military power). Speaking to Benjamin’s foundational legal 
violence, Foucault claimed, “law is born of real battles, victories, massacres and conquests,” 
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and that “law was born in burning towns and ravaged fields” (quoted in Coleman, 2011: 133). 
In a similar vein, and writing about the quotidian violence of the courtroom, Robert M. Cover 
(1986: 1601) famously argued, “legal interpretation takes place in a field of death and pain.” 
The death and pain of which Cover wrote referred not to some aberration within law, or to 
some metaphorical violence, but to a corporeal violence that he considered inherent to the law. 
Continuing this line of thought, Sarat and Kearns (1991: 1) argue, “law is a creator of both 
literal violence, and of imaginings and threats of force, disorder and pain.” The association of 
law and violence is visible, they contend (1991: 6), “in the discrete acts of law’s agents – the 
gun fired by the police, the sentence pronounced by the judge, the execution carried out 
behind prison walls.” But as Derrida reminds us (1992: 925), all law contains and unleashes 
force, for “there is no law without enforceability, and no applicability or enforceability without 
force, whether this force be direct or indirect, physical or symbolic.”  
 
Attending to the violence of lawfare is important, not least because contemporary 
commentators on lawfare seem to equate the use of law as a weapon with immaterial violence. 
The critical legal literature, however, shows that the violent manifestations of law are, to speak 
with Delaney (2010), quite literally ‘worlded’, and TWAIL shows that international law visited 
untold – and quite real – violence upon the colonies. As Cover (1986: 1605) reminds us, “[…] 
the normative world-building which constitutes “Law” is never just a mental or spiritual act. 
A legal world is built only to the extent that there are commitments that bodies are placed on 
the line.” The violence of law, that is, is ultimately realised, “in the flesh”. This kind of violence 
is missing from contemporary conversations about lawfare, but CLG, CLS and TWAIL can 
help us to recover this meaning of law’s violence and to examine what Kedar (2014: 108) has 
called its “violent spatialization[s]”. This is to read lawfare as a form of ‘doing’ that has material 
effects in the world. It is to ask not so much what lawfare is – the question that has preoccupied 
the lawfare debate – but rather what lawfare does, where and to whom. Following Delaney 
(2010: 8) we may therefore ask: how, under what conditions, and with what consequence is 
lawfare “spaced or spatialized, how is it worlded?” Working toward this will provide a 
geographically and historically informed theorization of law, war and violence. 
The concepts of jurisdiction and interlegality provide another fruitful avenue for further work 
on lawfare and the legal geographies of war and violence. I mentioned above that spaces of 
war are saturated by international legal regimes. But more than international law governs war. 
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Domestic laws, and domestic interpretations of international laws also govern its conduct. For 
example, in seeking Congressional authorization of the US war against the Islamic State in 
November 2014, President Obama was seeking a legal basis for military action, one more 
broad-based and deliberative than the Executive (and yet constitutionally legal) fiat he used to 
justify bombing Iraq and Syria only a few months earlier. To take a quite different example, 
the existence of military courts and the military justice system in all advanced militaries bears 
testimony to the fact that war, or at least the conduct of soldiers in war, is regulated – however 
unevenly or seemingly ineffectively – by law. Another scale and site of law that shapes the 
conduct of war is ‘operational law’ (OPSLAW) or the ‘rules of engagement’ (ROE) (Smith, 
2014). These laws combine international and domestic law with military objectives and 
represent a compromise between legal and political restraints on the use of force and the 
simultaneous need to protect one’s own troops while also fulfilling military objectives. As such, 
OPSLAW and ROE are a particularly militarized articulation of law and are used by military 
commanders as a kind of ‘checklist’ for what they are and are not allowed to do in war (Jones, 
forthcoming(a)). 
 
There are multiple and overlapping legal regimes of war. Attending to these regimes in their 
multiplicity is an important way for CLG to engage with the international and transnational 
scales of law that have been “curiously absent” (Barkan, 2011: 589), from legal geography and 
which are also largely absent from political-geographical accounts of war. But this means more, 
or rather something different than replacing one scale and site of law (the national, the 
municipal) with a wider legal frame (the international, the global). Political and legal geography 
would benefit from bringing these larger legal frames into view in order to better understand 
how it is that war ‘gets done’ in and through international and transnational spaces (see Jeffrey, 
2011; Pearson, 2008). But this does not render other scales and sites of law such as domestic 
courts, local legal protests, or even seemingly idiosyncratic legal technicalities and procedures 
redundant (Benson, 2014; Riles, 2005). To the contrary, engaging perspectives on what 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1987: 288) called ‘interlegality’ could be very useful: “More 
important than the identification of the different legal orders is the tracing of the complex and 
changing relations among them.” The concept of interlegality recognises the multi and 
overlapping jurisdictionality of legal space. Meanwhile, recent work on legal temporality and legal 
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‘chronotopes’ (Valverde, 2014) shows the value of a spatio-temporal understanding of 
interlegality, because legal regimes and jurisdictions fade in and out across time.  
 
As Valverde (2009) contends, jurisdiction is an inherently spatial concept that involves a 
demarcation in physical space of an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Jurisdiction is not simply a rule but 
governs which rules will apply – when, where, and to whom. When and where jurisdictions 
overlap, legal contests and spatial disputes inevitably arise, exposing the political work that 
jurisdiction conceals. One example of this is drone warfare and the conduct of ‘targeted killing’ 
strikes in areas where there is no internationally recognized warzone. The US maintains that 
drone strikes in places like Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan fall under the laws of war and are 
legal as long as they conform to the basic rules of war. Opponents of drone warfare, however, 
argue that the laws of war do not apply because the US has not declared war on these states 
or has not been invited into these states to kill ‘terrorists’ (e.g. O’Connell, 2009). They argue 
that the correct framework is human rights law, which imposes greater restrictions on the use 
of force, rendering most – if not all – drone strikes illegal. Ultimately, this debate is about 
jurisdiction, its application and its limits. This example highlights the value of an approach 
which understands jurisdiction as politically contentions and performative, and which also 
highlights the fact that both spaces of war and spaces of peace are legally plural and 
interwoven. The work on legal pluralism and jurisdiction would be immensely instructive to 
the study of lawfare because lawfare takes place across various legal scales, in domestic and 
international courts, and on the battlefield itself. It would also be a useful tool for critical legal 
geographers wishing to engage with questions of war, law and space. 
 
Finally, the lawfare literature is devoid of any sense that there is a geography and history of 
lawfare beyond the US and Israel and before 9/11. Such accounts require a more nuanced 
understanding of a phenomenon that may have been captured only recently by the neologism 
‘lawfare’, but which lived a worldly and itinerant life avant le lettre. A simple, yet important set 
of questions for the lawfare debate therefore concerns the potential wider geographies and 
histories of lawfare. What geographies give rise to discourses and practices of lawfare? Is 
lawfare a manifestation of asymmetrical (state versus non-state) war or are civil and inter-state 
wars also marked by discourses of il/legality? To put this another way: if we take war – broadly 
and historically conceived – as opposed to the recent manifestations of the US and Israeli ‘war 
Page 9 of 30 
on terror’ (which, as Gregory (2004) famously showed, had its roots in various colonial pasts) 
as our frame of reference, to what extent can war be said to be marked by lawfare, or by issues 
of il/legality, and how new is this concept? The legal historical geographies of war are 
important in articulating what lawfare does in different places (and what is or isn’t new about 
it). Without historically sensitive geographies, it is impossible to assess the newness but 
crucially also the salience and consequences of the putative ‘rise of the legal’ in war and the 
(re)emergence of lawfare in the early twenty-first century. Is law a dominant frame for all wars, 
or is it restricted to the types of war that may, potentially, be everywhere (Gregory, 2011) yet 
which seem to emanate from very particular military constellations (e.g. drone warfare, global 
‘counter-terrorism’, and cyberwarfare)? This posits the salience of lawfare as a spatial and 
historical question, rather than the universal and foregone conclusion. Borrowing tools from 
legal, political and historical geography, we are very well equipped to contribute to the critical 
legal geographies of war.  
   
III.Military lawfare: (an)Other weapon  
This section introduces the lawfare debate and offers a critical reading of the a-geographical 
and a-historical ways in which lawfare has been deployed. The crucial thing to note here is the 
way in which a very narrow and politically charged set of juridical processes emanating in 
particular places – namely the US and Israel – has come to define the lawfare debate.  
 
The term lawfare gained currency only after 9/11. At the turn of the century, commentators 
began using the term to describe the expanding role of law in relation to war. The practice of 
universal jurisdiction became especially important in circulating discourses of lawfare. As 
Gordon (2014) argues, the US had for a long time been cautious about the use of universal 
jurisdiction but as soon as international law, and especially human rights law, began being 
deployed to check certain practices in the ‘war on terror’ it adopted a decidedly oppositional 
stance. This is evidenced in the US opposition in 2002 of the passing of the Rome Statute that 
established the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a “permanent tribunal to prosecute 
individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.” (Gordon, 2014: 324). 
Despite this opposition, in the early 2000s European national courts indicted several high-
ranking US government officials and military persons and began trying them in abstentia 
(Human Rights Watch, 2006). By 2005, following several legal challenges emanating from the 
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wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, the annual US National Defense Strategy 
defined the use of courts and other legal instruments against the US as a form of terrorism: 
“our strength as a nation will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the 
weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism” (DoD, 2005: 5).  
 
Several other factors contributed to this radical equation of international law with terrorism, 
but two policies were particularly salient. The practice of torture, extraordinary rendition and 
imprisonment without trial in what became known as the ‘global war prison’ propelled US 
militarism into the international legal spotlight (D’Arcus, 2014; Reid-Henry, 2007). Specifically, 
the publication of images of torture and prisoner abuse at Abu Gharib in 2003-4 and the 
subsequent leaking of the infamous ‘Torture Memos’ in 2004 placed US war practices at the 
centre of a global legal controversy. Dunlap (2001b: 293) insists that developments in 
communications technology began to have a big impact on the way that ‘democratic states’ 
fought wars at the turn of the 21st Century. Specifically, he worried about the “raw images of 
war”, which could include “LOAC [law of armed conflict] violations”, which in-turn are made 
available “almost instantaneously to publics around the world.” He argued that in “order to 
maintain the kind of public support the militaries need to prosecute a war, adherence to LOAC 
in fact and perception is essential (Dunlap, 2001b: 293, emphasis in original). Abu Gharib and 
Guantanamo Bay undid any legitimacy that the US may have had; it was a personal relations 
disaster but more importantly it signified the ultimate abuse of law and the Torture Memos 
were artefacts of lawfare par excellence.  
  
Neoconservatives in the US felt differently, however. Lebowitz (2010) argued that the ‘real’ 
abuse of law in Guantanamo came not from those who conducted and authorized torture but 
from the ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ (another term of lawfare art) and the NGO’s and 
lawyers who represented them. According to her, the detainees constructed a “mistreatment 
narrative” which they used “as ammunition for waging tactical law-fare” (Lebowitz, 2010:  
361). She contends that “[b]y following what was tantamount to scripted legal advice, detainees 
and their advocates in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks launched a massive campaign through 
various court systems worldwide” (Lebowitz, 2010: 359). What is interesting here is the 
extension of the lawfare label to US lawyers in particular and to the human rights community 
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in general, because in this discursive space human rights law itself becomes indistinguishable 
from the enemy Other and must therefore be militated against. 
 
The second – and related – policy that has drawn international legal criticism and which has 
inspired several judicial appeals and court cases in the US is the practice of extra-judicial 
assassination. The practice, which precedes the ‘war on terror’ by several decades1, is now 
synonymous with ‘drone warfare’ in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia (see Gregory, 2011). The 
assassination/drone policy, which began under Bush and accelerated under Obama has 
attracted widespread forms of condemnation, but noteworthy here are the legal petitions and 
accusations of illegality made against both individuals and departments within the US 
Government (e.g. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama et al. 2010, 10-1469 (JDB); ACLU vs. Dept. of Justice 
et al. 2009, 08-cv-1157 (JR)). These cases point to a distinctly juridical battle that is still taking 
place. But these litigious attempts to achieve justice for an increasing number of victims have 
been dismissed as an illegitimate use of law and a dangerous ‘politicization’ of human rights 
(Newton, 2011). 
 
Israel is the other place where the lawfare discourse has been prominent. Here, most 
commentators begin their analysis of lawfare with the publication of a UN investigation into 
war crimes committed by Israel and Hamas during ‘Operation Cast-Lead’ – Israel’s massive 
military onslaught on Gaza in 2008-9. Dubbed the ‘Goldstone Report’, after its author Richard 
Goldstone (a former prosecutor at the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda), it was a damning condemnation of both Israeli and Hamas actions 
during the three-week war. But most commentators’ gloss over the fact that the UN also 
investigated Hamas’ war crimes and instead focus on Goldstone as a powerful symbol of the 
ultimate politicisation of law by the UN (e.g. Blank, 2011).  
 
The lawfare debate reached fever pitch in Israel in 2010 when Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu told the press that Goldstone is but a “code word for an attempt to delegitimise 
Israel’s right to self-defense”. He listed Goldstone as “one of Israel's most serious security 
challenges” alongside Iran’s nuclear program, and Hamas rocket fire (quoted in Nelson, 2010). 
More recently, defenders of Israeli national security have blamed the large number of civilian 
deaths in the 2014 invasion of Gaza on the UN, claiming that the UN Relief and Work Agency 
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(UNRWA) harbour ‘terrorists’ and help to store Hamas weapons (The Lawfare Project, 2014). 
Such contorted and unfounded claims work to counter the widespread belief that, once again, 
the Israeli military used disproportionate force in Gaza, and did so against civilian and 
government infrastructure, which are not legitimate targets even in modern urban warfare.  
 
Several neoconservative think tanks championing a similarly militant view have sprung up over 
the last few years (e.g. NGO Monitor; The Lawfare Project; BBC Watch). The Lafware Project 
(TLP) is an organisation established by lawyer Brook Goldstein in the wake of the Goldstone 
Report to defend Israeli (and US) interests from international criticism. TLP acts as a 
“safeguard against the abuse of the law as a weapon of war”, according to its website. TLP 
defines lawfare as “the abuse of Western laws and judicial systems to achieve strategic military 
or political ends.” The qualification of lawfare as something that is done to Western legal 
systems is highly significant and as TLP’s website notes, lawfare:  
"[…] must be defined as a negative phenomenon to have any real meaning. Otherwise, 
we risk diluting the threat and feeding the inability to distinguish between that which 
is the correct application of the law, on the one hand, and that which is lawfare, on the 
other. […]” (TLP, n.d.) 
 
Renderings like these, which juxtapose ‘our’ rule of law against ‘their’ abusive practices, have 
become fundamental to the lawfare debate. ‘We’ do not do lawfare (we merely ‘correctly apply’ 
laws). When we view Western legal and military practice against the pre-modern tactics of the 
Other it becomes apparent that the Other has not yet reached the civilized standards that mark 
‘us’ as societies of the ‘rule of law’ and them as pre-legal savages. Indeed, what lawfare boils 
down to, according to Laurie Blank (2011: 16), is the “exploitation of the law of war” by 
“insurgent groups”. Law in the hands of the Other constitutes a ‘legal jihad’ according to 
Goldstein and Meyer (2009). Dunlap (2008: 421-422) does not merely call the enemy savages, 
but refers rather to the “savagery of the[ir] illegalities”, suggesting that the enemy has not yet 
been civilized through law. Lawfare, then, according to both the TLP and a growing 
jurisprudence, is a barbaric politicisation of law, something that is allegedly above the fray of 
politics in the ‘West’.  
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Lawfare is very much a creature of the ‘war on terror’ and what Derek Gregory (2004) 
memorably called its ‘architectures of enmity’ have invariably shaped its discourses. Lawfare 
conducts war by other means. It shifts the battle to the legal domain, to spaces where the 
legitimacy of war is defined by lawyers and legal scholars and also to spaces where war is 
consumed by publics who develop their own legal consciousness of war (see Delaney, 2009). 
But the fact that lawfare has emanated from the US and Israel does not mean that its discourses 
and practices are confined to these narrow geographies. In tracing these geographies of lawfare 
above, I seek not to privilege but rather to undo them, for they represent and reveal a highly 
partial and particularly narrow set of ideas concerning the relationship between war and law 
and the geographies of lawfare. To broader geographies and richer conceptualizations of 
lawfare we now turn.    
 
IV.Colonial lawfare and TWAIL 
As I have suggested, CLS and CLG are well placed to offer a critique of the ‘lawfare is new 
and unique to the US and Israel’ argument because they are attentive to questions of how law, 
power and violence intersect in time and space. But in this section I cast our attention to the 
specifically colonial antecedents of lawfare, and to third world approaches to international law 
– or TWAIL. TWAIL has escaped the attention of both CLG and the lawfare debate but it 
offers rich insights into the colonial histories and geographies of lawfare. Importantly, it also 
focuses on the violent manifestations of international law and the role that war and violence 
have played in its creation. Attending to the colonial historical geographies of lawfare via 
TWAIL enriches our understanding of lawfare because it offers an explicitly geographical 
theorization of lawfare, one that understands the spaces of war/law as necessarily multiple, 
contested and mutable, even as they inscribe and are inscribed by unequal power relations. 
 
TWAIL is a critical school of international legal scholarship and an intellectual and political 
movement that emerged in the mid-1990s. Its origins lay in the decolonization movement that 
swept parts of the globe after World War II (Mutua, 2000). Its symbolic birth was in 1955 at 
an Asian African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia. As Willets attests: “The importance 
of Bandung was that for the first time a group of former colonial territorries [sic] had met 
together without any of the European powers […] this was an assertion of their independence” 
(quoted in Chimni, 2006: 6). Although TWAIL speaks with no single authoritative voice, 
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combining a variety of theoretical approaches – including Marxist and Feminist critiques of 
law – its raison d’êter is three-fold according to Mutua (2001: 31): 
The first [objective] is to understand, deconstruct, and unpack the uses of international 
law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of a racialized hierarchy of 
international norms and institutions that subordinate non-Europeans to Europeans. 
Second, it seeks to construct and present an alternative normative legal edifice for 
international governance. Finally, TWAIL seeks through scholarship, policy, and 
politics to eradicate the conditions of underdevelopment in the Third World. 
TWAIL therefore rejects the claim that international law is objective, universal, and benign. 
Indeed, as one prominent Third World jurist on the International Court of Justice observed: 
“classical international law […] consisted of a set of rules with a geographical bias (it was a 
European law), a religious-ethical aspiration (it was a Christian law), an economic motivation 
(it was a mercantilist law), and political aims (it was an imperialist law)" (Bedjaoui, 1985: 153). 
And yet, as the brilliant Antony Anghie has argued, international law “consistently attempts to 
obscure its colonial origins, its connections with the inequalities and exploitation inherent in 
the colonial encounter” (Anghie, 1999: 107). Lawfare must confront these erasures if it is to 
have anything to say about the role of law in modern war.  
 
Prior to the 1990s the discipline and history of international law tended to be narrated as a 
simple and benign shift from natural to positive law. As late as 1996 Antony Carthy claimed 
of international law scholarship: “no systematic undertaking is usually offered of the influence 
of colonialism in the development of the basic conceptual framework of the subject” (quoted 
in Neocleous, 2014: 49). Today, however, there is a burgeoning literature on international law 
and colonialism (e.g. Benton, 2010; Orford, 2006). Anghie (2007) traces the colonial origins 
of international law to the works of Francisco de Vitoria (a sixteenth-century Spanish 
theologian and jurist) and the Spanish conquest of the Americas, though it should be noted 
that several modes of imperial law pre-dated the origins of international law (Benton, 2010). 
Anghie argues that the language of law has been used for centuries by colonial and imperialist 
powers to justify and legitimise untold violence. Seen thus, international law has never been a 
project that universalises benign principles across difference, but has been a key institution in 
the production and management of difference, a tool of governance for the ‘First World’ to 
rule over the ‘Third World’. For Anne Orford (2006), the ‘Other’ of international law 
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constitutes the limit of the law, creating an 'inside' of what is to be protected and an ‘outside’ 
which is excluded. This line of inquiry prompts us to consider international law as a project 
that, in its bid to include all, has excluded many. Looping back to Anghie (2007: 315), TWAIL 
scholarship is insistent that law has "disparate and unpredictable effects on differentially 
situated people" which, crucially, is to say that an uneven geography underpins international law. 
 
This variegated geography of international law warrants further attention from both CLG and 
lawfare. TWAIL and cognate fields such as legal anthropology offer several specific tools and 
metaphors that are instructive toward this end. First is a cluster of concepts that deal with law 
as a mobile phenomenon (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckman, 2005) and which 
emphasizes the geographies of legal comparativism (Kedar, 2014). Born in the age of colonialism, 
comparative law is traditionally scientific, formal and classificatory; it compares two or more 
legal regimes according to ‘the law in the books’ (Kedar, 2014: 108), and treats them as a 
separate and isolated set of rules and procedures. Such formalistic accounts have recently been 
challenged by what Kedar calls a nascent ‘critical comparative legal geography’ (CCLG). In 
this regard, the work of legal scholar William Twining (2009) is groundbreaking. Using the 
metaphor of mapping (Santos, 1987; Mahmud, 2010), Twining questions the neat, ordered 
and hierarchical organization of legal relations and argues that the local, national, and 
international scales of law are muddied by: 
“empires, alliances coalitions, diasporas, networks, trade routes and movements . . . 
Special groupings of power such as the G7, the G8, NATO, the European Union, the 
Commonwealth, multi-national corporations, crime syndicates and other non-
governmental organizations and networks.” (Quoted in Kedar, 2014: 99).  
 
Twining’s analysis of what he calls ‘legal diffusion’ is important because, like the lawfare 
literature, traditional legal comparative work has neglected to consider the social, cultural and 
– crucially – spatial relations and settings in which law is made and ‘worlded’. But critical 
comparative work is also important because it traces legal relations across space and time and 
dispenses with the idea that history and geography are inert. Rather, CCLG treats space and 
time as practices that actively shape and re-shape legal configurations and jurisdictional maps.   
 
Page 16 of 30 
Legal comparativism has spawned a literature on legal diffusion and circulation, which focuses 
explicitly on law as a mobile and mutable phenomenon. In her study of what she calls the 
'circulations of law' in the context of British colonial rule in India, Malaya and Egypt, Iza 
Hussin (2012: 21) writes that law is a "travelling phenomenon”. Hussin’s wonderful analysis 
of mobile law reminds us that law leads a worldly and social life: 
"Law did not travel alone: it had carriers and agents, who themselves had travelling 
companions – government officials and diplomats, traders and businessmen, 
missionaries, pilgrims, scholars, privateers. Its departure was often a matter of heated 
debate; its arrival at each port of call required translation, negotiation and 
domestication, as well as all-out war." (Quoted in Jones, forthcoming(b)).  
 
The work on legal mobilities is instructive to lawfare because it alerts us to the itinerant life of 
law and the importance of space in forging particular legal systems and discourses. It also 
brings to the fore the fact that legal realities and particular legal spatializations are the result of 
the work of several agents and actors; to paraphrase Hussin, law does not travel alone – which, 
of course, begs the question of how law travels, where and why? There is space for interesting 
conversations between legal mobilities and legal diffusion, and other mobilities literatures such 
as policy mobilities in geography (e.g. Peck, 2011) and the work on travelling theory (Said, 
1983, 1999) and travelling culture (Clifford, 1997), none of which have engaged each other. 
These literatures offer lawfare and TWAIL rich understandings of the mobility of things and 
ideas and they remain “sensitive to the constitutive roles of spatiotemporal context” (Peck, 
2011: 1). There is also potential for an analysis of the movability and mutability of ‘legal 
technicalities’ (Riles, 2005) and methods from Actor Network Theory (ANT) could assist in 
approaching law as a set of things and practices which are iterated, changed and re-signified 
in different contexts. 
 
Once viewed through the prisms of interlegality, critical comparativism and mobility, 
international law in general, and lawfare specifically, take on quite new shapes and possibilities. 
These concepts may also help “to encourage exploration of the unlikely spaces where 
international law may indeed be found, but which are not visible on traditional 'maps'” 
(Pearson, 2008: 491). In short, TWAIL, and cognate work in legal anthropology and legal 
comparativism could contribute to a re-mapping of international law and lawfare. Such a 
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mapping exercise would take ‘worlded’ violence seriously, though it need not “solely focus on 
the dark heritage of colonial dispossession but also should look at some contemporary 
inspiring transformations, which can serve in planning reforms and imagining progressive 
solutions.” (Kedar, 2014: 111).   
 
The TWAIL scholarship is relevant to the lawfare debate in many ways but it is through its 
insistence on prying open the violent historical geographies of international law that it is most 
powerful, for by doing so it exposes as fallacy the claim that law has only recently been 
weaponised and that ‘terrorists’, non-state actors and the ‘Other’ were the first to deploy in 
the post 9/11 era. This is to read law not only through a historical axes but crucially also 
through a geographical one, because if we can recognise the weaponisation of law at the heart 
of empire and colonialism, we can trace lawfare’s legacy like a red thread through the 
metropole to the colony and beyond to the post-colony. The military lawfare literature would 
benefit from the insights provided by TWAIL and CCLG (even if it may not agree with them) 
and borrowing from their critical and historical methodologies would strengthen and help 
contextualise future studies of lawfare and the geographies of international law.  
 
V.Toward a critical geography of lawfare?  
In the very same year that Charles Dunlap first began writing about lawfare, anthropologist 
John Comaroff proposed a competing – though seldom noted – definition. For Comaroff 
(2001: 306), lawfare signified “the effort to conquer and control indigenous peoples by the 
coercive use of legal means”. Comaroff’s definition directly challenges Dunlap’s vision of 
lawfare by placing the smoking gun – law as weapon – in the hands of the colonial state (and 
not in the hands of colonial subjects). Yet the lawfare debate teaches us that lawfare is 
characterised by a multiplicity of processes and is performed by manifold actors. Lawfare may 
have its antecedents in the colonial encounter, but Comaroff (2001: 306) also realised that it 
“had many theaters, many dramatis personae, many scripts.” What he meant was that lawfare 
is not uniform and unidirectional but has what he called a “counterinsurgent” potential.  Given 
this potential, and given the prominence of lawfare discourses today, does it make sense to 
only speak of lawfare as a colonial tool? Might it not also be a ‘post’-colonial tool, and could it 
not also be put to ‘insurgent’, counter-colonial use?  
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In 2007, and writing with Jean Comaroff, John Comaroff returned to the topic of lawfare and 
offered a new definition not so dissimilar to that originally proposed by Dunlap. For them, 
lawfare had come to mean “the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, 
to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2007: 30). Yet 
their understanding of lawfare differs from Dunlap’s definition in two crucial respects. First, 
pace the critical legal traditions, they are extremely attentive to questions of history, space and 
power. For them, lawfare did originate with colonialism but this is not one and the same thing 
as saying that only colonial powers can wield it. As they go on to write, sometimes lawfare: 
“is put to work, as it was in many colonial contexts, to make new sorts of human 
subjects; sometimes it is the vehicle by which oligarchs seize the sinews of state to 
further their economic ends; sometimes it is a weapon of the weak, turning authority 
back on itself by commissioning the sanction of the court to make claims for resources, 
recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty. But ultimately, it is neither the weak nor the meek 
nor the marginal who predominate in such things. It is those equipped to play most potently inside the 
dialectic of law and disorder. (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2007: 31, emphasis added). 
 
Examining lawfare as a practice and something that is performed by social actors acting in a 
milieu of power relations is an important line of enquiry that is missing from mainstream 
accounts of lawfare. This is somewhat surprising given that lawfare is supposed to have 
emerged as a result of asymmetric war as a way of redressing the imbalance of power between 
advanced militaries and smaller, less militarily powerful groups and nations. Beyond rhetoric 
from think tanks like TLP, there is little sense of how effective these groups and nations have 
actually been at harnessing lawfare and there have been very few studies that compare state 
lawfare alongside non-state lawfare. But these economies of power are important because they 
move us beyond thinking about lawfare as a political or social construction and encourage us 
to think about performances of lawfare and to ask what lawfare does and for whom.  
 
Although it does not identify itself as such, a nascent critical lawfare literature has emerged 
over the last decade. This literature questions conservative and military understandings of 
lawfare as a one-way phenomenon, and focuses our attention on state lawfare. The emergence 
of this literature owes much to the work of David Kennedy (2006), whose book Of War and 
Law has been widely cited (e.g. Weizman 2011, 2012; Morrissey 2011; Snukal and Gilbert, 
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forthcoming). In his writing on war and law Kennedy identified processes of juridification and 
emergent relationships between war and law that are arguably wider and more salient than the 
narrow questions raised by Dunlap and others:  
Warfare has become a modern legal institution. At the same time, as law has 
increasingly become the vocabulary for international politics and diplomacy, it has 
become the rhetoric through which we debate-and assert-the boundaries of warfare, 
and insist upon the distinction between war and peace or civilian and combatant. Law 
has built practical as well as the rhetorical bridges between war and peace, and is the 
stuff of their connection and differentiation. (Kennedy, 2006: 5) 
 
Kennedy never says when (or where) warfare became a ‘legal institution’ but his work has 
inspired several scholars to take up the concept of lawfare and to critically interrogate the 
interstices of war and law. Eyal Weizman (2010; 2011), Lisa Hajjar (2013) and Jones 
(forthcoming(a)), for example, have explored the lawfare tactics used by Israel in the 2008-9 
war on Gaza and more generally of Israel’s legal regimes of Occupation in the Palestinian 
Territories. For Weizman, the adoption of the language of IHL and lawfare is a slippery slope 
and he believes that its vocabulary has been used to justify a political-juridical reawakening of 
the philosophy of the ‘lesser evil’ (Weizman, 2011). This philosophy has a temporal referent 
that he calls the “humanitarian present” (p. 1) and for him the “age of lawfare” (p. 16) portends 
worrying signs for humanitarians and those who care about the rule of law. The conclusion 
he reaches sounds a note of caution to those who oppose war in the name of law; to do so, 
he argues, is to misunderstand the relationship between war and law and misses the point that 
war takes place through law, and not in opposition to it.  
 
Taking up this point, John Morrissey (2011) has provided an account of what he calls “forward 
juridical warfare” where he argues that we need to understand the offensive component of 
lawfare. Offensive lawfare is a pre-emptive form of legal conditioning of the battlespace and 
for Morrissey it involves the legal preparation that goes into the protection of US military 
personnel stationed around the globe in what are called ‘forward deployments’. Morrissey’s 
contribution is important because, contra the military lawfare literature, he recognises that ‘we’ 
do lawfare but he also alerts us to the fact that there are many different types of lawfare and 
that geographical accounts are required to understand its various practices. Michael Smith 
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(2014) documents a similarly offensive lawfare at work in the US/NATO invasion and 
intervention in Afghanistan. He argues that what he calls the ‘geolegalities’ of ‘martial law’ 
have become “essential to grasping the hybrid political and economic formations associated 
with Western interventionism of the post–Cold War period.” (Smith, 2014: 144). His argument 
considers several iterations of lawfare and as he explains, Western military interventions: 
are wars of law insofar as they are organized, instituted and waged by the ostensibly 
liberal democracies of the global North; they are wars through law in that […] they are 
pervasively governed by law; and they are wars for law, as they aim to establish stable, 
liberal or quasi-liberal regimes where potential threats can be mollified through 
development or neutralized through lawfully monopolized force. 
 
From Smith we learn that lawfare takes place not only at the geo-political level (through 
treaties, agreements etc.), but also on the ground in Afghanistan at specific sites where ‘rule of 
law operations’ frequently blur into what he calls “counterinsurgency lawfare” (p. 160). Last, 
but by no means least, a forthcoming paper by Snukal and Gilbert examines lawfare through 
the lens of legal ‘grey holes’ and discusses the fraught issues of accountability and 
compensation in the Nisour Square massacre in Iraq in 2008. There, the infamous private 
military company Blackwater opened fire on civilians, killing 17 and injuring 20 more. Snukal 
and Gilbert use this as a focal point to examine the legality and ethics of the privatization of 
military force – something they see as fostering deliberate ambiguities and slippery (mis)uses 
of law. 
 
While these accounts of lawfare are very critical of the ways in which lawfare is being deployed 
and while they recognise that it is state militaries that ‘play most potently in the dialectic of law 
and disorder’, they implicitly re-inscribe the idea that lawfare is somehow a recent 
development. Against this, and pace the arguments put forward by TWAIL, Mark Neocleous 
(2014: 46) argues that law and war “have been woven together since the birth of early modern 
political thought, the birth of the laws of nations and, concomitantly, the transition of 
feudalism to capitalism.” A critical history of lawfare, Neocleous therefore argues, must attend 
to its origins not only in the colonial encounter but also in the very formation and development 
of capitalism itself.  Such a project comports with Barkan’s (2011) recent call for further 
research on the ‘legal geographies of capitalism’ and also has resonances with Lauren Benton’s 
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(2010) ground-breaking legal-historical work on the European ‘search for sovereignty’, 
wedded as it was to the emergence of a new capitalist order (see also Morrissey, forthcoming; 
Smith, 2014).  
 
A nascent critical lawfare is emerging then, but it is still limited in its historical and geographical 
scope and there is space for a much broader engagement with the historical geographies of 
war and law. As I have suggested, TWAIL perspectives offer one way to enrich critical lawfare 
but to broaden the project further critical lawfare would also benefit from searching beyond US 
and Israeli militarism to sites where law and lawfare play a less obvious or somehow different 
role in the conduct of war. Indeed, critical lawfare might do well to explicitly recognise that 
not all wars are marked by discourses of legality and lawfare. Lawfare is but one form of war, 
one that operates alongside and through many other ways of waging later modern war. 
Interrogating the geographies of lawfare is important but this does not mean that ‘juridical 
wars’ should be analytically or empirically privileged over wars that are not – or are lesser – 
shaped and defined by law. Critical lawfare faces a challenging set of questions concerning 
precisely this geography: what wars are marked by the juridical and which are not? Why and 
with what consequences have legal discourses come to predominate in some wars and not 
others? In other words, what does the geography of lawfare look like and how is it changing? 
VI.Conclusion 
In this paper I have reviewed the literature on lawfare and have suggested that there are several 
ways of defining and approaching the concept. I have argued against conceptualisations of 
lawfare as a post 9/11 phenomenon and have critiqued the military lawfare literature for being 
historically and geographically myopic. I have suggested that one productive way around such 
apprehensions is to turn to critical legal approaches and, in particular, to conceive of lawfare 
as a colonial tool that predates its use and circulation today. Attending to these colonial 
histories of law necessarily broadens the potential geographies of lawfare because it displaces 
the centre of laws’ violence from the particular constellations of the colonial present (as 
important as these clearly are) to the spaces of the colonial pasts, which have their own 
geographies (even inasmuch as they continue to haunt our present).  
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The task remains that in order to look forward and to explore putatively ‘new’ and ‘different’ 
formations of lawfare, we first must look (back) to legal historical geographies of war. This is 
not simply to argue that history matters. It is to insist that the entire lawfare debate rests on 
an assumption that, suddenly, law has become important to war without ever interrogating the 
when or where of that claim. I intend this not as a dismissal of what is a fascinating literature, 
but more as a provocation for those interested in lawfare to explore its genealogies and 
geographies. This is an opportunity for CLG, CLS and TWAIL and proponents of military 
lawfare to examine their (possible) shared intellectual heritage and to articulate where their 
theoretical and political differences may lay. It is also an opportunity to square a circle between 
political, historical and legal geography and to attend to the multiple and overlapping spaces 
and process of war and law.  
 
Work in this direction is already underway. Extending Blomley’s (1989) concept of the ‘law-
space nexus’, Jones and Smith (forthcoming) have proposed that we should think about the 
interconnections between war and law as forming a set of entangled relationships captured by 
what they call a “war/law/space nexus”. This nexus, Jones and Smith argue, recognises that 
“war and law have an intimate connection” but it also emphasises that this relationship is 
“historically and spatially variable.” In positing the relationship between war and law as 
dynamic, the war/law/space nexus opens up precisely the kind thinking that has been missing 
from the lawfare literature. Conceptualised thus, lawfare becomes a spatial and historical 
question, rather than a universal and foregone conclusion. The value of lawfare, therefore, 
may be realised not so much by thinking about it as a neologism of recent vintage but rather 
as a broader phenomenon and set of relationships in a changeable war/law/space nexus. 
 
The lawfare literature heralds – and is a manifestation of – a series of vitally important 
transformations in later modern war. To be sure, war may have always entailed rhetorics of 
justification and regimes of authorisation yet as Smith and Jones (forthcoming) have argued, 
today war and law have become inseparable and now, more than ever, “war requires a legal 
armature to secure its legitimacy and organise its conduct”. The emergence of, and growing 
interest in lawfare would seem to suggest that something, recently has changed; that there has 
been an intensified or somehow more duplicitous recourse to the law and to legal 
argumentation vis-a-vis questions of war. The question of why and how this transformation – or 
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intensification – has taken place is a complex one beyond the scope of this review but there is 
little doubt that it is tied intimately to the hyper-mediatisation of war and the growing 
‘reflexivity’ of advanced militaries who have become, to borrow from Foucault, obsessed with 
the conduct of their own conduct. Here, for example, is David Kennedy (2006: 122) 
connecting the juridification of war with processes of mediatisation and perception: 
“Communicating the war is fighting the war, and law – legal categorization – is a 
communication tool. Defining the battlefield is not only a matter of deployed force, or 
privileging killing; it is also a rhetorical claim.” 
 
These changes require a careful articulation as to what is and what is not novel about the 21st 
Century (re)weaponisation of law. Here, Historians Strachan and Sheipers (2011) offer a 
cautionary note about the putative ‘changing character of war’ heralded by several 
commentators espousing what has become known as the ‘new wars’ thesis (see Kaldor, 2005). 
Over the last decade or so the thesis has provoked useful discussions as to how war has 
changed since the end of the Cold War, but its critics have retorted that change and newness 
have been overstated (e.g. Gregory, 2011).  Strachan and Sheipers (2011: 18), however, go 
even further: “the perception of newness is often not so much a matter of empirical change 
but of our conceptual perspective on war”.  
 
With this note of caution in mind, and by way of closing I return to Comaroff and Comaroff 
one last time. In Law and Disorder in the Postcolony they argue that everyday life is becoming 
increasingly juridified. They claim that politics itself has "migrated to the courts", shrouding 
itself in "culture of legality" where: 
"[c]onflicts once joined in parliaments, by means of street protests, mass 
demonstrations, and media campaigns, through labor strikes, boycotts, blockades, and 
other instruments of assertion, tend more and more—if not only, or in just the same 
way everywhere—to find their way to the judiciary". (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2007: 
26) 
 
What is specific about the logic of juridification in comparison to other logics? What specific 
rhetorical figures and forms do jurists, legal scholars, and (military) lawyers utilize to make 
something appear as a legal (not ethical, not political) problem, which then needs to be solved 
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by experts?2 Law has an audience; it speaks to an addressee, and the field of perception in later 
modern war has been expanded to include a multiplicity of publics, both at home and abroad 
(see Smith, 2006). Thus it is not so much that war is 'migrating to the court', but that the courts 
and the law are migrating elsewhere, into the very spaces and ontologies of war, (re)signifying 
and (re)presenting it as they do. Alongside the "judicialization of politics" could it be possible 
that we are witnessing a corresponding juridification of war that is at least partially new and/or 
different to that which came before? If we are – and that conditional must again be 
underscored – the task ahead is to chart and examine the legal historical geographies that 
underwrite and continue to animate the juridification of war. And all the while it will be 
important to ask: What does the reduction of war to law enable? What are the consequences of 
thinking about war in distinctly legal terms and what might have been lost? What other 
registers, whether political-economic, social or ethical have been marginalised as law has sent 
the gavel down on war? What does law do to war, and war to law? These are questions and 
problems: invitations for some preliminary critiques on a fascinating and emerging field. 
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Notes 
1 The US conducted assassinations in Vietnam under what was called the Phoenix Program and the CIA were 
involved in assassination attempts in Central and South America, Africa and Asia throughout the 1950s and 
1960s (Jones, forthcoming b) 
2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for posing these two questions. 
                                                        
